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CLEAN AIR ACT MAYHEM: EPA'S TAILORING
RULE STITCHES GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS INTO THE WRONG
REGULATORY FITTING
By: Teal Jordan White
ABSTRACT

Regardless of whether you believe that human activities cause or contribute
to global warming, regulatory action seeking to mitigate the future consequences of climate change will impact the lives of every American. On January 2, 2011, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources took effect. The EPA rule
implementing this regulation is the conclusion, for the time being, of a sequence of recent judicialand administrativeactivities comparable to a regulatory domino effect.
The Supreme Court started the cascade of regulation in Massachusetts v.
EPA, in which the Court held that the EPA has the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act if further evaluation indicated greenhouse gases were endangering public health and mobile sources
were contributingto the threat. Under President Obama's guidance, the EPA
finalized that Endangerment Finding and concluded human health was
threatened by greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources. Subsequently,
the EPA published three codependent directives to regulate greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act: (1) the Tailpipe Rule to regulate emissions from
mobile sources; (2) an official interpretationof the Clean Air Act, concluding
that when greenhouse gases are "actually regulated" under the Tailpipe Rule,
stationary sources are also subject to regulation;and (3) the TailoringRule, a
revision of statutory thresholds aimed at shielding small sources from rigorous
Clean Air Act permitting requirements.
In light of the unique challenges presented by global climate change, this
Comment analyzes whether the EPA's Tailoring Rule is lawful under existing
statutory authority. According to the express language of the Clean Air Act,
congressional intent underlying the statute, and legal precedent, the EPA's
TailoringRule represents an unauthorizedexpansion of EPA authority and is
an arbitraryuse of the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases. Because
the Tailoring Rule violates the unambiguous language of the Clean Air Act,
subverts the congressionalintent underlying the Act, infringes upon the separation of legislative and executive powers, and relies improperly upon the disfavored legal doctrines, the Tailoring Rule should fail judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION

"The health effects of [man's alterations of the environment] are
often unknown, sometimes unknowable .

.

. the statutes-and com-

mon sense-demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the
regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."' Yet
the question remains: In the face of uncertainty, can precautionary
regulatory action proceed beyond statutory authority?
The potential impacts of global climate change pose unique challenges. Only recently have climate scientists been able to explain decades of research in plain language to create widespread awareness
that the planet is warming and humans are largely responsible. Still,
the science is non-consensual and uncertain, specifically regarding
how human activities directly or indirectly affect the global temperature and whether changes in human conduct can affect change. 2 Such
uncertainty makes the government's task, as "trustee" of the public
domain, even more difficult. Quite certainly, however, the unknown
proportion and unforeseen impacts of global climate change will challenge and require change from all three branches of the government.
Part II of this Comment will show that the Supreme Court recognizes the uniqueness of the climate change challenge and is willing to
adapt notwithstanding uncertainty. The text and legal implications of
Massachusetts v. EPA indicate that the judicial branch acknowledges
1. Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
2. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 554 (2007) ("[T]here is
considerable uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system varies
naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols."); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIs REPORT
72-73 (The Core Writing Team, ed. 2007) (reporting that the analysis required to
translate the physical consequences of climate change to localized economic and
human impacts is evolving but inherently uncertain); Lisa Schenk, Climate Change
"Crisis" - Struggling for Worldwide Collective Action, 19 COLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y 319, 343 (2008) ("Scientific predictions regarding climate change are unclear as
to where, when, and how climate change will strike."); Kimberly A. Strassel, The Climate Change Climate Change, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 26, 2009, http://on
line.wsj.com/article/SB124597505076157449.html ("The collapse of consensus has
been driven by reality. The inconvenient truth is that the earth's temperatures have
flat-lined since 2001, despite growing concentrations of [carbon dioxide].").
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the scientific nexus between greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming as well as the scientific predictions of future harm. Further,
the Court seems willing to acknowledge that strict judicial constructs
will not always offer an appropriate remedy to such unusual problems.
Finally, the Court is unwilling to allow the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to rely on scientific uncertainty for inaction; the
EPA must find policy guidance regarding regulation of greenhouse
gases in the Clean Air Act.
Part III details the regulatory cascade resulting from the intersection of the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion, the change in executive administration, and the accompanying political priorities. In response to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the EPA
undertook the prescribed process to determine if greenhouse gas
emissions threaten public health and welfare. Contemporaneously,
Congress entertained, and rejected, legislation that proposed to establish a comprehensive, nationwide program to control greenhouse gas
emissions. Because Congress was unable to provide consensual legislation to address global warming in the face of the economic impacts
of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, the EPA forged ahead to
"comply with the Supreme Court's decision recognizing EPA's obligation to address climate change." 3
In the absence of comprehensive legislation to address global climate change, existing legislation, specifically the Clean Air Act, will
be stretched and manipulated to accommodate the unique problems.
However, such action forces the question of whether the uncertain
scope and intensity of climate change impacts are great enough to
grant a regulatory agency the power to act outside legislative direction. In Part IV, this Comment argues that the EPA has exceeded its
authority to regulate under the precautionary approach. Although
the EPA has broad discretion to implement provisions to protect public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act, the Agency exceeded
its statutory authority by issuing the Tailoring Rule. To evade the "absurd results" and "administrative impossibility" resulting from its
hasty greenhouse gas rulemaking, the EPA unilaterally amended the
Clean Air Act and impermissibly substituted its political judgment for
that of Congress. Since the Tailoring Rule confers extraordinary
power on the EPA, fails to abide by the text of the Clean Air Act, and
undermines unambiguous congressional intent expressed in the Clean
Air Act, the EPA's Tailoring Rule is arbitrary and capricious and
should fail judicial review.

3. Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Envtl. Prot. Agency Adm'r, to All Envtl.
Prot. Agency Emps. (Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/Administrator/
memotoemployees.html.
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THE SUPREME COURT DIRECTS THE EPA TO MEND A SEAM
IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

A.

The Massachusetts v. EPA Opinion

A series of events culminated in the EPA's current effort to regulate
greenhouse gases under a patchwork of rules; however, the triggering
event was the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA. 4 Massachusetts and eleven other states, a number of local governments, and private organizations sued the EPA for failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector.' The
petitioners claimed that respected scientific findings connect increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to a rise in global
temperatures. 6 Further, the petitioners claimed that such global
warming adversely impacts Massachusetts because a significant portion of the State's coastal property would be permanently or temporarily lost to sea level rise or periodic flooding events.7
In review of a petition for rulemaking, which requested that the
Agency regulate greenhouse gases, the EPA concluded that it lacked

the authority to regulate new vehicle emissions under the Clean Air
Act because Congress did not intend for greenhouse gases to be regulated under the Act and that carbon dioxide was not an "air pollutant"
as defined by the Act.8 Although the Court conceded that a governmental agency has broad discretion to choose how to carry out its delegated responsibilities, an agency's refusal to issue rules is subject to
judicial review.9 In contrast to the EPA's reading of the Clean Air
Act, the Court used a tight textual interpretation of the statute and
found that it has a "sweeping definition of 'air pollutant' [which] includes 'any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters ambient air.""' Because greenhouse gases,

including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons, are physical and chemical substances, which are emitted into
ambient air, the Court found that these greenhouses gases were unambiguously "air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act."
4. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5. Id. at 505.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 523. The U.S. Supreme Court dedicated a substantial portion of the
opinion to establishing the petitioners' standing. The Court stated that, since the party
seeking review of a congressionally-created procedural right-here, a challenge to
EPA action-is a sovereign state rather than a private party, only one of the petitioners needs to have standing for the Court to review the petition. Id. at 517-18. The
Court focused on Massachusetts' standing.
8. Id. at 528; see also, Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,929-33 (Sept. 8, 2003).
9. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527.
10. Id. at 528-29.
11. Id. at 529.
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The arguments that the EPA posed to show that it could not regulate greenhouse gases are interesting to note now that the Agency has
actually proceeded to regulate the same gases. First, the EPA argued
that congressional actions and deliberations that occurred after passing the Clean Air Act were conclusive illustrations that Congress did
not intend for the Agency to regulate greenhouse gases under the
Act.' 2 The Court found, however, that the "EPA identifie[d] nothing
suggesting that Congress meant to curtail EPA's power to treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants."1 3 Next, the EPA argued that regulating
carbon dioxide emissions would force it to regulate fuel economy
standards, a job that Congress delegated to the Department of Transportation ("DOT").14 The Court responded by asserting that the responsibilities of agencies may overlap when addressing an
interdisciplinary issue like global warming; however, the fact that
DOT sets mileage standards "in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities."" Finally, the EPA argued that even if it
has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be "unwise to do
so at this time" because such action might interfere with the President's efforts to negotiate with developing nations to reduce their
emissions.' 6 Once again, the Court dismissed the argument because
the EPA's statutory command is clear." The Court held that greenhouse gases are "air pollutants" within the meaning of the Clean Air
Act and gave the EPA three alternatives: (1) issue a finding that
greenhouse gas-related air pollution "may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare;" (2) issue a finding of no endangerment; or (3) explain why making such a finding would be impossible." Further, if the EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Act
requires the Agency to regulate the emissions of "the deleterious pollutant[s] from new motor vehicles.""
B.

The Legal Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA

It is important to recognize that the Court's decision did not require
the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, even from mobile sources.
Rather, the decision closely tracked the text of the Clean Air Act and
determined that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse
gases if the Agency determines that the emissions of such gases pose a
threat to human health and well-being.2 0 Further, the decision mandated an evaluation of whether greenhouse gases were endangering
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

531-32.
532.
532-33.
534.
532-33.
533 (citing Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1) (2006)).
519-20.
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public health and the environment, whether mobile emissions were
contributing to the endangerment, and whether regulation of mobile
sources was required-components of an Endangerment Finding and
Cause or Contribute Finding. 21
Critics of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision contend that the Court
majority was beguiled by the narrow focus of the controversy at issue
when it concluded that an endangerment finding would not lead to
"extreme measures." 2 2 In reality, as Justice Scalia highlights in his dissent, the Clean Air Act is a "malleable statute giving broad discretion" to the EPA. 23 Further, scholars point out that the Clean Air Act
is a highly-interconnected statute; therefore, once the EPA regulates
greenhouse gases under one provision of the Act, it must regulate
greenhouse gases under multiple other provisions.2 4 In fact, Professor
Jonathon Adler contends that the Massachusetts v. EPA decision
granted the EPA broad authority, and perhaps duty, to regulate
materials contributing to atmospheric harm. 25 Thus, the impact of
Massachusetts v. EPA does not stop at greenhouse gas emissions from
mobile sources. It will be interesting to see how closely courts track
the text of the Clean Air Act now that the EPA faces legal challenges
to its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under Clean Air Act
authority.
Other critiques of the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion focus on the
Court's standing analysis. After emphasizing that the test for standing
is easier to satisfy when a sovereign entity brings the action and a
procedural right is involved, the opinion addresses the traditional
three-part standing test:2 6 (1) a concrete and particularized injury that
21. William J. Walsh, Mark A. Erman & Jane C. Luxton, Industry Cries Foul to
EPA's Attempt to Regulate GHG Emissions Using the Clean Air Act, 10 SUSTAINABLE
DEv. L. & PoL'Y 39, 40 (2010) (citing Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 533).
22. George F. Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 919, 922 (2010).
23. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

24. NATHAN RICHARDSON, ART FRAAS & DALLAS BURTRAw, GREENHOUSE GAS
REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR Acr: STRUCTURE, EFFECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF A KNOWABLE PATHWAY 3 (Resources for the Future 2010), available at
www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-10-23.pdf; Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at
922; Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288 (2010) [hereinafter Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free?].
25. Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 63, 63-64 (2007) (arguing that "[u]nder the Court's new interpretation, the
Clean Air Act . . . provides EPA with roving authority, if not responsibility, to regulate any substance capable of causing or contributing to environmental harm in the
atmosphere.").
26. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-19; see also Daniel A. Farber, A Placed-Based
Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2008) ("The idea that procedural
injuries have a lower threshold for standing was not new, but the Court had not previously indicated that judicial review of an agency action might itself be a component of
such a 'procedural' right.").
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is actual or imminent; (2) reasonably traceable to the challenged action that would (3) likely be redressed by a favorable decision.2 7 The
Court's treatment of each standing element in the Massachusetts opinion has been criticized-questioning whether sea level rise and potential flooding in Massachusetts was a particularized and imminent
injury in fact;28 whether the EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions was "fairly traceable" to cause global warming and potential
subsequent sea level rise and flooding; 29 and whether finding that the
EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles would "redress" global warming. 30 All of these critiques have
merit based on Supreme Court precedent for environmental litigation;
however, a full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
The general consensus is that the Massachusetts v. EPA decision
adopted a lenient standing framework for sovereign environmental litigants;" however, one could also argue that the Massachusetts Court
27. Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 517 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992)).
28. See id. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The very concept of global warming
seems inconsistent with th[e] particularization requirement. Global warming is a phenomenon 'harmful to humanity at large.'" (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part))).
29. See e.g., Mary Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The
Black Hole of Private Climate Change Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REV. 477, 495 (2010)
(arguing that "if the MassachusettsCourt had fully abided by the precedents in Simon
[v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization] and Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife], the Court would have concluded that the public law claims against the EPA in
Massachusetts were not fairly traceable to the plaintiffs' injury"); Jonathan H. Adler,
Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2009) (arguing that under the Massachusetts "loosened standard, any contribution of any size to a
cognizable injury would be sufficient for causation, and any step, no matter how
small, is sufficient to provide the necessary redress").
30. See Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("the redress petitioners seek is focused no more on them than on the public generally-it is literally
to change the atmosphere around the world."); Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 755 (2009) (agreeing with Justice Roberts's
dissent because "[gliven the small portion of greenhouse gases attributable to domestic automobiles, it is doubtful whether the EPA's regulation of automobile emissions
would create a 'substantial likelihood' of remedying the threatened injury to Massachusetts's coastline.").
31. Approval or disapproval of the Massachusetts standing test, however, is nonconsensual. See, e.g., Susan Muller, Unprecedented Harm: Will the Roberts Court Recognize the Distinction Between Global Warming and Its Effects?, 44 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 317, 341 (2010) (arguing that "[c]onsiderable confusion already exists due to
ambiguity in the Massachusetts holding on [the standing] issue, and the varied attempts of circuit courts to apply that holding."); Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized
Grievances and Judicial Discretion, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 1331 (2007) (suggesting that
Massachusetts v. EPA discards the ban against generalized grievances); Randall S.
Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate
Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & P'OY REV. 121, 175
(2008) (concluding that Massachusetts v. EPA may be an indispensible tool for progress in combating climate change in the immediate future by enhancing access to the
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expressly recognized the unique nature of the climate change challenge. The causal connection between human conduct and resulting
climate change is attenuated and cumulative. Especially, the gap in
time between an emission event and resulting consequences, such as
sea level rise, can be decades-long. Further, not a single factory or
automobile, but aggregates of sources, combine to cause the adverse
impacts of global climate change. Finally, this aggregate nature of the
resulting injury requires regional and global efforts to effect change.
Therefore, the tripartite requirements of federal standing-a concrete
and particularized injury rather than a general grievance, that is
"fairly traceable" to the conduct of the defendants, and can be redressed by a favorable finding in the court-are problematic, if not
impossible, to satisfy for climate change matters. In light of these
unique characteristics of climate change, the Court's opinion appears
to recognize the need for a new understanding about the nature of the
harm, the causal relationships, and the potential for redress in climate
change litigation.
III.

EPA SEIZES THE NEEDLE AND THREAD
A. The Endangerment Finding

THE

Although the Massachusetts v. EPA decision clearly found that
greenhouse gas emissions are an "air pollutant" and that the EPA
could not avoid determining whether greenhouse gas emissions endangered human health and welfare (an "Endangerment Finding"),
the out-going Bush administration punted the obligation by issuing an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPR").3 2 The ANPR
summarizes available climate change science and its effects on the Endangerment Finding at issue under section 202 of the Clean Air Act;
reviews the EPA's work to-date on greenhouse gas emission standards
in motor vehicles; analyzes interconnections among Clean Air Act
provisions; examines opportunities and challenges different regulatory
approaches would face; and seeks public comment on petitions to set
greenhouse gas emission standards for other types of mobile
sources.3 3 The ANPR does not propose or recommend the use of any
particular Clean Air Act provision to regulate greenhouse gases or
commit to specific subsequent steps.34 In fact, then-EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson used the ANPR to argue against regulating
courts. However, the decision could be interpreted to be limited to actions brought by
states); Jonathan H. Adler, supra note 29, at 1087 (arguing that after decisions in
Massachusetts v. EPA and Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs. Inc., the Roberts
Court has expanded the realm of justiciable claims under Article III).
32. Patricia F. Sharkey, Recent Developments in Greenhouse Gas Regulations, AsPATORE, 2010 WL 3252450, at *8 (2010); see generally Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act; Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (proposed
July 30, 2008) [hereinafter ANPR].
33. See generally ANPR, supra note 32.
34. See id.
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greenhouse gases and asserted that greenhouse gas regulation was illsuited to the structure of the Clean Air Act.
The ANPR document actually substantiates concerns voiced in response to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision because the document
details how the EPA's regulation of greenhouse gases under one provision of the Clean Air Act will mandate regulation under multiple
provisions-leading to "extreme measures."" As commentators have
pointed out, the ANPR provides a veritable roadmap for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act-including
hundreds of pages that hypothesize how to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from cars, trains, ships, airplanes, power plants, factories,
and refineries."
The ANPR includes several unprecedented components which
highlight the controversial nature of greenhouse gas regulation in
America." The published document commences with a letter from
the President's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and Office of Management and Budget, which states that the EPA Administration agreed to publish the ANPR under a statement that it did not
represent Administrative Policy." The letter was drafted and published due to interagency disagreement about the document, particularly regarding interpretations of law, economics, science, and policy
published in the ANPR.4 0 In fact, the ANPR included letters from
four other agencies criticizing the draft; however, all of the agencies
agreed with the EPA that the Clean Air Act is an "unsuitable vehicle"
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.4 1 The interagency reviewers
concluded that following the "regulatory roadmap" detailed in the
ANPR "could result in piecemeal application of command-and-control regulation .

.

. covering both U.S. manufacturing activity and a

35. Id. at 44,354-55 ("I believe the ANPR demonstrates the Clean Air Act, an
outdated law originally enacted to control regional pollutants that cause direct health
effects, is ill-suited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases. Based on the
analysis to date, pursuing this course of action would inevitably result in a very complicated, time consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations.").
36. Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 922.
37. See Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 294 (arguing that an
Endangerment Finding has significant implications because of the interrelationships
between provisions in the Clean Air Act for other greenhouse emitters); Sandy Liddy
Bourne, EPA Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR): Alert 3, THE
HEARTLAND INST. (August 26, 2008), http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/
(not23773/EPAAdvanceNotice-ofProposedRulemakingANPRAlert_3.htmi
ing that under the ANPR, EPA's proposal includes applying what's been dubbed "the
Grass Mileage Standard" to lawn mower engines and weed whackers).
38. Gabrielle Sigel, Oscar F. Marrero & Allison A. Torrence, eds., Climate Change
Update: EPA ANPR Defers Making EndangermentFindingfor GHGs, Requests Public Comment, Publishes Inter-Agency Debate, JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1 (July 2008),
www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5OO/5715/
climateschangedigest_07.08.pdf.
39. Id.
40. ANPR, supra note 32, at 44,356.
41. Id.
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broad range of commercial and household activities to an extent well
beyond the scope of current regulation." 42 Such regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act would result in unprecedented expansion of EPA authority, would affect every industrial
sector, and could impact every household in the country.4 3
Notwithstanding the discord among administrative agencies, the
Obama Administration made clear its intention to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.4 4 On April 17, 2009, less than four months after
President Obama took office, the EPA signed the Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act ("Proposed Endangerment Finding"). 45 The proposed
rule included two key findings: (1) elevated concentrations of six
greenhouse gases endanger both public health and welfare of current
and future generations; and (2) the emissions of these greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles and their engines contribute to the endangerment. 46 After a sixty-day public comment period, during which
the EPA reportedly received over 380,000 comments, the EPA released the final Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Final Endangerment Finding") on December 5, 2009.47 In reaching its finding, the EPA reviewed the Supreme Court's instructions in Massachusetts v. EPA and
associated legal requirements in the Clean Air Act, evaluated available scientific data regarding greenhouse gas emission impacts on climate change, and assessed the accompanying impacts on public health
and well-being.4 8
The EPA's Final Endangerment Finding was based on scientific
data primarily provided by the U.S. Global Climate Research Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), and
the National Research Council. 49 The scientific and technical information associated with the Final Endangerment Finding was
42. Id. at 44,357.
43. Id. at 44,355.
44. Ronald Zdrojeski & Peter Knight, Filling the Void: Agencies Don't Wait for
Federal Legislation to Respond to Climate Change, in WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES IN CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON COMMUNICATION WITH
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, UNDERSTANDING LEGAL CHALLENGES, AND NAVIGATING
RECENT AND UPCOMING CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATIONS 33, 33-34 (Aspatore

2009), available at 2009 WL 1342288, at *1.
45. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (ApT. 24, 2009)
[hereinafter Proposed Endangerment Finding].
46. Id.
47. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,500 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 1) [hereinafter Final Endangerment Finding].
48. See DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR Acr HANDBOOK
§ 5:35 (20th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw CAAHBK.
49. Final Endangerment Finding, supra note 47, at 66,497.
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presented in a separate Technical Support Document ("TSD").5 0 The
applicable TSD was first drafted in 2007 and released as part of the
ANPR published on July 30, 2008; however, the final TSD purportedly included new scientific reports associated with greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change."1
Although a majority of the comments received by the EPA on the
Proposed Endangerment Finding were identical mass-mail comments,
a large number of individual comments concerned the legitimacy of
the science behind the endangerment determination. 52 The EPA,
however, rejected "climategate" alarmists by issuing a press release
asserting that "[s]cience overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity." 5 1 Subsequently, the EPA received ten petitions for reconsideration of the
Final Endangerment Finding. 54 The petitions were submitted by fossil
fuel interests, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, anti-regulatory organizations, and the state governments of Texas and Virginia.55 The petitions generally challenged the science behind the Final Endangerment
Finding, particularly the EPA's reliance on IPCC findings.56 Specifically, the petitioners rely on a mass of emails and information released
on the Internet from University of East Anglia's Climatic Research
Unit ("CRU"), which purportedly revealed that "the IPCC reports
were not the product of a rigorous, transparent and neutral scientific
process."" The petitions alleged that the information released by
CRU revealed that many of the key scientists that authored IPCC sci50. CLIMATE CHANGE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR ENDANGERMENT AND
CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A)
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/Endangerment%20TSD.pdf.
51. See id. at 2.
52. See generally Endangermentand Cause or ContributeFindingsfor Greenhouse
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act: EPA's Response to Public Comments, Vol. 1, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/comments/volumel..html#foreword (last updated Apr. 14, 2011).
53. EPA News Release: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 7, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/0/08D11A451131BCA585257685005BF252.
54. See EPA's Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause
or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556, 49,557 (Aug. 13, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/response-decision.pdf.
55. See Denial of Petitionsfor Reconsiderationof the Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/petitions.
html (last updated on Apr. 14, 2011).
56. See EPA's Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause
or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,557.
57. Petition for Reconsideration of Peabody Energy Company at ES-1, No. EPAHQ-OAR-2009-0171 (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/Petition for ReconsiderationPeabodyEnergyCompany.pdf.
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entific assessments were motivated by a policy agenda that did not
align with scientific data and "caused them to cross the line from neutral science to advocacy."" The petitions for reconsideration also
challenged the EPA's Final Endangerment Finding based on alleged
and confirmed mistakes in the IPCC reports and new scientific data
not previously considered in the Final Endangerment Finding."
On July 29, 2010, the EPA issued a statement denying the petitions
for reconsideration of the Final Endangerment Finding.60 After
"months of consideration," the EPA found no evidence in the petitions' claims that the science underlying the Final Endangerment
Finding cannot be trusted. 6 ' The EPA subsequently published its formal denial of the petitions, dedicating almost forty pages to reinforce
the science behind its determination.6 2 According to the Denial of
Petitions for Reconsideration, the Agency examined the processes
used by IPCC and the U.S. Government's approach to approving
IPCC reports and found that they are well-grounded in science, not
based on policy considerations.6 3 Additionally, the EPA reviewed alleged errors in the appropriate IPCC reports and found that the errors
are minor and do not affect the validity of the overall report or the
Final Endangerment Finding. 64 The EPA released its denial with biased language stating that "scientific evidence is robust, voluminous,
and compelling. Climate change is happening now, and humans are
contributing to it."65
The extent of on-going legal challenges to the Final Endangerment
Finding are beyond the scope of this Comment; however, it is relevant
to point out that the EPA's proposed roadmap to regulating greenhouse gases has been challenged at every step. While the petitions for
reconsideration were pending with the EPA, seventeen court challenges were filed with the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum58. Id. at ES-3.
59. See EPA's Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause
or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,558.
60. See EPA Rejects Claims of Flawed Climate Science, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (July 29, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsfld0cf6618525a9efb8
5257359003fb69d/56eb0d86757cb7568525776f0063d82f!Open Document.
61. Id.
62. See generally EPA's Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,557.
63. Fact Sheet, EPA's Denial of Petitions to Reconsider EPA's Greenhouse Gas
Endangerment Findings, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/endangerment/downloads/endangerment-factsheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2011).
64. Id.
65. Denial of Petitions for Reconsideration of the Endangerment and Cause or
ContributeFindingsfor Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
supra note 55.
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bia Circuit.6 6 The D.C. Circuit has consolidated these cases under
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, et al. v. EPA (D. D.C. 091322).67 The petitioners, including many of the same states and industrial entities that petitioned the EPA for reconsideration, are asking
the judiciary to review the process and procedures the EPA followed
to generate the Final Endangerment Finding. On the opposing side,
environmental advocacy organizations and seventeen states requested
to intervene in support of the EPA. 6 1 The petitions for judicial review
seek to force the EPA to re-evaluate the Final Endangerment Finding
in light of the revelations regarding the IPCC reports and to re-open
the public comment period to ensure the Endangerment Finding is
based on reliable science, as required by the Clean Air Act."9
Scholars argue that the Final Endangerment Finding is likely to
withstand legal challenge because the standard for review of an administrative ruling based on health, safety, and welfare is extremely
difficult to overcome. 70 Before the court reaches the merits, the petitioners will have to survive a challenge to their standing to bring suit.
The EPA will likely argue that the Final Endangerment Finding imposes no direct obligations on the regulated community, and therefore, the petitioners lack an actual injury;" however, the petitioners
will likely argue that the Final Endangerment Finding is a precursor to
66. See Martin T. Booher & Andrew N. Davis, New Federal Regulatory Initiatives
and Compliance Obligationsfor Emitters of Greenhouse Gases, ASPATORE, 2010 WL
3252456, at *7 (2010).
67. The petitioners include American Iron and Steel Institute, Gerdau Amsteel
Corp., American Farm Bureau Federation, National Mining Association, Peabody
Energy Company, Massey Energy Company, Rosebud Mining Company, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. on behalf of fifteen House Republicans and business associations, and the states of Alabama, Virginia, Texas, Alaska, Michigan, Nebraska, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Utah.
68. The intervener-respondents include the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, the City of New York and the states of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Minnesota. Robin Bravender, States Take Sides in Greenhouse Gas 'Endangerment' Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/gwire/2010/03/19/19greenwire-states-take-sides-in-greenhouse-gas-endangerme29019.html.
69. See Petitioners' Motion for Stay at 31, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc.
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 10-1281 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://
www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/16/document-gw_03.pdf.
70. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100, 1122 (2008) (explaining that agencies win 68.8% of
the time before the Supreme Court and that agency affirmance rates are even higher
before the lower federal courts).
71. See Jeffrey A. Lamken, EPA Greenhouse Gas Regulation: State Impacts and
State Interests, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Mar. 12, 2010), http://
www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/03-12-1 OLamkenLegalBack
grounder.pdf.
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a cascade of regulation which would cause actual injury to commercial
interests and the general economy of the states.7 2 Further, as sovereign entities, States can assert "special solitude" in the standing analysis, as established under Massachusetts v. EPA.
Assuming the petitioners establish standing in federal court, the
D.C. Circuit must determine whether the EPA's Final Endangerment
Finding was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" under
the Administrative Procedure Act.7 ' The scope of review under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow, and a court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the EPA. However, the Supreme
Court has explained that "the agency must examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" 7
Because courts are not panels of scientists nor do they have the capacity to evaluate the validity and reliability of climate change science,
the court will give broad deference to the EPA's administrational expertise. Unless the petitioners can show that the EPA had no reasonable basis for its determination, challenges to the scientific basis of the
Final Endangerment Finding will probably be defeated in court.
The Final Endangerment Finding was the EPA's pledge to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, unless Congress
passes comprehensive legislation addressing the issue. 6 Critics of the
regulatory road map, presented in the ANPR and anticipated after the
Final Endangerment Finding, assert that the Clean Air Act is an im72. Robin Bravender, Climate: Lawsuits Roll In As EPA 'Endangerment' Deadline
Looms, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2010/02/15/1 ("[T]here is a good likelihood that ultimately the endangerment determination petitions become consolidated with any challenges to the motor vehicle
rule itself, which likely would moot any standing questions." Roger Martella, former
EPA general counsel during the George W. Bush administration).
73. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) ("Given
that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis"); see
also Lamken, supra note 71.
74. PAUL G. ULRICH, P.C. & SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE GUIDE 9TH CIRCUIT, § 11:16 (2d ed. 2010).
75. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962)).
76. Both President Obama and EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson have repeatedly
stated they would prefer Congressional action to Agency action. See Steven Mufson
& David A. Fahrenthold, EPA is Preparingto Regulate Emissions in Congress'sStead,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/07/AR2009120701645.htm ("Jackson said her agency and other
administration officials would still prefer if Congress acted before they did."); Darren
Samuelsohn, Climate: Obama Prefers Congress to EPA When It Comes to Emission
Cuts-Browner, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2009/02/23/2 ("The president continues to believe the best path forward is
through legislation, rather than through sort of the weaving together the various authorities of the Clean Air Act, which may or may not end in a cap-and-trade
program.")
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proper tool to effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions." Such
critics argue that greenhouse gases are fundamentally different from
the air quality problems the Clean Air Act was intended to address."
Absent congressional action otherwise, however, the Final Endangerment Finding opens the door for EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions under the Clean Air Act not only from motor vehicles, but
also from stationary sources.
B.

The Clean Air Act Structure

The Court's interpretation of the Clean Air Act to require an endangerment determination under section 202(a)(1) and the subsequent Endangerment Finding compels a closer look at the statute"one of the most complex regulatory statutes in American Law."o In
fact, the complexity of the statute closely matches the perceived complexity of air pollution when it was enacted in 1970.1 The Clean Air
Act is primarily devoted to regulation of mobile and stationary
sources of air pollution.8 2 Mobile sources generally include vehicles
and their engines while stationary sources include industrial facilities." Title II of the Clean Air Act provides that the EPA can set
emission standards for new vehicles under section 202, the primary
point of controversy in Massachusetts v. EPA.8 4 According to the
statute,
77. See ANPR, supra note 32, at 44,359; Richard A. Epstein, Carbon Dioxide: Our
Newest Pollutant,43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 797, 815 (2010) (arguing that coercion under
the Clean Air Act is likely to fail and innovation has a better chance of success).
78. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 301 (2000) ("Global climate change, however, differs fundamentally from other environmental problems."); Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant,
Gen. Counsel, to Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Adm'r, (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemoAug282003.pdf (concluding that "[i]n view of
consistent congressional action to learn more about global climate change, the absence of express authority to regulate global climate change, no indication of congressional intent to provide such authority, and the far-reaching implications of regulation
to address global climate change," the EPA cannot regulate greenhouse gases under
the Clean Air Act); Bonnie Barnett, Mark Hammond & Yesenia Villasenor, Tailoring
Rule Finalized: EPA Issues Much Anticipated "Fix" for PSD and Title V Greenhouse
Gas Permitting, DRINKER BIDDLE ENVTL. ENERGY GRP. 1 (June 2010), http://www.
drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/28c2b9ff-2f3b-4898-b88e-61937634dabd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cae0el6a-43ad-4e65-a624-69479a50c915/FixForPSD%26
TitleV.pdf (stating "the [Clean Air Act] was not designed to regulate emissions like
[greenhouse gases]").
79. See WOOLEY &MORss, supra note 48, at § 5.35.
80. Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 287.
81. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 202(a) (1) of
the Clean Air Act, 13 A.L.R. FED. 2D 703, 703 (2006) (reporting that Congress enacted
the Clean Air Act after "finding that the growth in the amount and complexity of air
pollution had resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare").
82. Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 287.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.8 5
As previously discussed in Part II(A), the Massachusetts v. EPA Court
held that the Clean Air Act "unambiguously" provides that greenhouse gases can be treated as air pollutants.8 6 Thus, the EPA has the
authority, and perhaps a duty, to consider whether greenhouses gases
endanger public health and welfare." In accordance with Title II of
the Clean Air Act, if EPA makes a finding of endangerment, it must
regulate the harmful emissions from new motor vehicles."
Although this regulatory process appears to be clearly defined by
the Clean Air Act, the interconnected nature of the statute creates
significant implications for commercial stakeholders outside of the
motor vehicle sector. In accordance with the Clean Air Act, when the
EPA establishes greenhouse gas emissions standards for new motor
vehicles, the greenhouse gases become "subject to regulation" under
the statute.8 9 Consequently, greenhouse gases would also be "subject
to regulation" under other provisions of the Clean Air Act, including
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") and Title V permitting programs for stationary sources.90 Although these stationary
source provisions are regulated under section I and section V of the
Clean Air Act, respectively, the immediate connection between all
three provisions was clarified by an EPA memo authored by thenAdministrator Stephen Johnson on December 18, 2008, commonly referred to as "the Johnson Memo."9" The Johnson Memo determined
the Clean Air Act requires PSD and Title V permits for air pollutants
"actually regulated" under the Act.9 2 If the EPA finds that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles endanger public health and
thereafter implements regulations to control the deleterious emis85. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
86. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007).
87. Id. at 530-31.
88. Id. at 533.
89. Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 923 (citing the ANPR, supra note 32, at
44,367 (noting that an endangerment finding under section 202(a) may prompt regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources)).
90. Id.
91. Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Envtl. Prot. Agency Adm'r, to Reg'1
Adm'rs (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/psd-interpretive-memo_12.18.08.pdf [hereinafter The Johnson Memo].
92. Id. at 1 1 1 ("As of the date of this memorandum, EPA will interpret this
definition of 'regulated NSR pollutant' to exclude pollutants for which EPA regulations only require monitoring or reporting but to include each pollutant subject to
either a provision in the Clean Air Act or regulation adopted by EPA under the Clean
Air Act that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.").
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sions, then greenhouse gases would be "actually regulated" under the
Act, and stationary source permits would be required for greenhouse
gases as well." The Johnson Memo received considerable criticism
and the EPA granted a petition for reconsideration; however, the
agency reaffirmed and slightly refined its interpretation of "pollutants
subject to regulation" in "the Jackson Memo" in April 2010." As a
result, once greenhouse gases are "actually regulated" under section
I of the Clean Air Act, other provisions of the statute would be implicated, effectuating greenhouse gas emission regulation on stationary
sources as well as other mobile sources including heavy-duty trucks,
off-road vehicles, marine vessels, and aircraft.
Following in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA and the Final Endangerment Finding, the EPA and the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA") undertook a joint rulemaking
"to establish a National Program consisting of new standards for lightduty vehicles that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve
fuel economy."96 The rule consists of two components: (1) the EPA
Tailpipe Rule, promulgated under Clean Air Act § 202(a); and (2) the
NHTSA Fuel Economy Act, promulgated under the Energy Policy
Conservation Act." According to the EPA's interpretation of the
Clean Air Act under the Johnson and Jackson memos, the Tailpipe
Rule also triggers the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources.98
C.

Sewing onto the Clean Air Act

On January 2, 2011, the EPA's greenhouse gas emissions standards
for light-duty vehicles took effect.99 On that date, in accordance with
the Jackson Memo, permits issued under the PSD and Title V Operating programs must also begin to address greenhouse gases because
those pollutants became "subject to regulation" under the Clean Air
Act.oo The PSD Program is a pre-construction permitting program
93. Marybeth Houlihan, et al., 2009: A Year of Significant CAA Developments on
All Fronts, 40 ENVTL. L. RPTR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,250, 10,252 (2010).
94. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2,
2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-02/pdf/2010-7536.pdf
(stating that the EPA is refining its interpretation to establish that the PSD and Title
V permitting requirements "will not apply to a newly regulated pollutant until a regulatory requirement to control emissions of that pollutant 'takes effect."').
95. Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 922-23.
96. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 2010)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, & 600).
97. See id. at 25,677-728.
98. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,007.
99. Id.
100. Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of
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for new and modified major sources of pollution.o' To comply, a
company must obtain a PSD permit from the EPA or a state environmental agency before constructing any new or modified source of pollution emitting or having the potential to emit 100 tons per year or
more of any criteria pollutant in an attainment area; however, if a
facility does not fall into one of twenty-eight listed categories, then a
threshold of 250 tons per year applies.' 0 2 The EPA estimates that 280
sources require a PSD permit per year,' 0 3 the administrative cost of
processing the paperwork for the permit is $84,500 for each applicant,
and it takes approximately one year to obtain a permit.' 0 4
The Title V Program requires any source that emits more than 100
tons per year of "any regulated air pollutant" to obtain an operating
permit.' 0 5 The Title V Program was implemented in attempt to facilitate compliance with other Clean Air Act programs by consolidating
all of a facility's requirements into a single permit.' 0 6 The Title V Program currently includes 15,000 regulated sources of pollution,' 7 administrative costs to obtain a permit average $46,350,108 and it
currently takes approximately six months to obtain a Title V
permit.' 0 9
The text of the Clean Air Act explicitly establishes the applicability
of the PSD and Title V permits at the 100 and 250 tons per year
thresholds described above."o Applying these statutory thresholds to
greenhouse gases, however, is problematic because carbon dioxide is
emitted at quantities that are many times greater than traditional air
Substantial Inadequacy and SIP Call, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,699 (Dec. 13, 2010),
available at http://69.175.53.6/register/2010/Dec/13/2010-30854.pdf; OFFICE OF AIR
QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PSD AND TITLE
V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES, 2-3 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/permits/GHG %20Permitting%20Guidance %20-%20
11-10-10%20public.pdf.
101. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2010).
102. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2006).
103. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,535 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 70 & 71), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-06-03/pdf/201011974.pdf#page=1 [hereinafter Final Tailoring Rule].
104. Id. at 31,535.
105. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006).
106. Air Pollution Operating Permit Program Update: Key Features and Benefits,
U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, 1, http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/permits/permitupdate/
brochure.html#what (last updated July 26, 2011).
107. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,540.
108. LINDA M. CHAPPELL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE
V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE 35 (May 2010), available at http://www.epa.

gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/riatailoring.pdf.
109. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,536.
110. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(i)(a)-(b) (2010); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a),
7502(c)(5), 7602(j) (2006).
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pollutants in similar economic-activity levels."' Inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions in the PSD and Title V Operating Permits will
significantly expand both programs. Application of the current statutory thresholds will require large office buildings, residential buildings, hotels, retail stores, and other similarly sized building projects to
undergo case-by-case EPA permitting."' The EPA itself reported
that when greenhouse gas emissions trigger PSD permitting, 82,173
new construction projects will require permits annually, which will
take a "decade or longer" to obtain."" Similarly, once greenhouse gas
emissions must be included in Title V Operating Permits, 6,118,252
1 14
sources will need permits, and each will take ten years to obtain.
The new Title V permits will cost permit authorities more than $123
billion annually, which does not include the costs to the regulated
facilities.15

Even the EPA recognized that imposing the statutory threshold
levels of greenhouse gases on the PSD and Title V permits would
"greatly increase the number of required permits, impos[e] undue
costs on small sources, overwhelm[] the resources of permitting authorities, and severely impair[] the functioning of the programs.""1
The EPA's solution was additional rulemaking-the Tailoring Rule,
which "tailors" the requirements of the PSD and Title V Programs to
initially limit the number of facilities that will be required to obtain
permits."' Under the Tailoring Rule, permitting requirements for stationary sources will be implemented in phases.1 18
In the first phase, which began on January 2, 2011, only sources currently subject to PSD requirements due to emissions other than greenhouse gases (facilities that are constructed or modified in a way that
significantly increases emissions of other pollutants) will be subject to
permitting requirements for greenhouse gases.' 19 For these sources,
projects with greenhouse gas emission increases of 75,000 tons per
year or more on a carbon dioxide equivalent basis will need to determine best-available control technologies for their greenhouse gas
111. Barnett, Hammond & Villasenor, supra note 78, at 2.
112. See Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 923-24 ("[A]n immense number and
variety of entities-including office buildings, hotels, large retail stores, enclosed
shopping malls, small manufacturing firms, and commercial kitchens-have the potential to reach 250 [tons per year] of CO 2 emissions.").
113. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,540, 31,557.
114. Id. at 31,540, 31,536.
115. CHAPPELL, supra note 108, at 19.
116. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,514.
117. Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deteriorationand Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL..PROT. AGENCY, 1, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/
documents/20100413fs.pdf (last visited July 18, 2011) [hereinafter Final Tailoring Rule
Fact Sheet].
118. Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Establishes New PSD and Title V Permitting
Thresholds, 20 No. 5 AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT 2.1, 1 (2010) [hereinafter AIR
POLLUTION CONSULTANT].

119. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,516.
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emissions.120 Similarly, in the first phase, only sources otherwise subject to Title V permitting would have to address greenhouse gases in
their Title V permits. 121 During the first phase, no sources will be
subject to Clean Air Act permitting solely because of greenhouse gas

emissions.122
In the second phase, which began on July 1, 2011, PSD permitting
requirements applied to new sources whose greenhouse gas emissions
are 100,000 tons per year or more on a carbon dioxide equivalent basis, even if the source is not otherwise subject to PSD permitting. 1 23
Modified sources that increase greenhouse gas emissions by 75,000
tons per year or more on a carbon dioxide equivalent basis were also
subject to PSD permit requirements.124 Starting on July 1, 2011, Title
V Operating Permits were required for facilities that have greenhouse
gas emissions of 100,000 or greater on a carbon dioxide equivalent
basis, even if the facility would not otherwise be subject to Title V

permitting.12 5
The EPA estimated that approximately 900 additional PSD permits
would be triggered by increases in greenhouse gas emissions from new
and modified stationary sources.126 Approximately 550 new sources
would be subject to Title V permitting due to greenhouse gas emission
thresholds. 2 7 The majority of sources newly covered by the Title V
permitting program will likely be solid waste landfills and industrial
manufacturers.1 2 8 In the Tailoring Rule, the EPA committed to undertake another rulemaking to begin in 2011 and conclude no later
than July 1, 2012.129 As promised in the text of the rule, this next
rulemaking phase will not require permitting for sources with greenhouse gas emissions below 50,000 tons per year on a carbon dioxide
equivalent basis.3 0 Finally, the Tailoring Rule also outlines the EPA's
requirement to complete a study projecting the remaining administrative burdens with respect to permitting stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 3 1 This study, due by April 30, 2015, will
consider the permitting authorities' ability to fund, hire, and train
staff; past experiences with greenhouse gas permitting for new sources
and technologies; and the success of streamlining measures for reducing the permitting burdens previously discussed. 1 32
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Final Tailoring Rule Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 2.
Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,516.
Id.
Id.
Final Tailoring Rule Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 2.
Id.
AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT, supra note 118, at 1.
Final Tailoring Rule Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 2.
Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,516.
AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT, supra note 118, at 7-8.
Id.
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Despite hopes of delayed implementation or modification, January
2, 2011 marked the date of applicability for the Tailoring Rule and the
beginning of a nationwide program that directly regulates greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States. 3 3 In response, opponents filed
twenty-six petitions challenging the Tailoring Rule.13 4 At issue is
whether the Tailoring Rule impermissibly alters the PSD and Title V
statutory thresholds, respectively, established in the Clean Air Act
without congressional action.' 3 5
IV.

THE

TAILORING RULE TIES KNOTS
INTO THE CLEAN AIR ACT

EPA's

The EPA implemented the Tailpipe Rule and subsequent Tailoring
Rule in direct response to a presidential announcement of a historic
national policy that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve
fuel economy for all new cars and trucks sold in the United States.' 3 6
Commentators have argued that the Obama Administration and the
EPA acted on these issues to "force the issue" and prompt Congress
to pass comprehensive legislation to address climate change.' 3 7 Be133. Jonathan W. Dettmann & James R. Spaanstra, Get Set for GHG Regulation:
The Tailoring Rule and Reporting Rule in 2011, FAEGRE & BENSON LLP (Jan. 4,
2011) http://www.faegre.com/12490.
134. Se. Legal Found. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (D.C. Cir. Index No. 10-1131) (consolidating 6 cases challenging the rule) and Ga. Coal. for Sound Envtl. Policy v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency (D.C. Cir. Index No. 10-1200) (consolidating 20 cases challenging the
rule). In September 2010, the above two cases were consolidated under Se. Legal
Found. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (D.C. Cir. Index No. 10-1131) and in November 2010,
this case was consolidated with the legal challenges to the Endangerment Finding and
the Tailpipe Rule in Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (D.C.
Cir. Index No. 10-1073). Petitioners include Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., Ohio Coal Association, American Iron &
Steel Institute, Gerdau Ameristeel U.S., Inc., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Georgia
Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy, National Mining Association, American
Farm Bureau Federation, Peabody Energy Company, Center for Biological Diversity,
Energy-Intensive Manufacturers' Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation,
South Carolina Public Service Authority, Mark R. Levin, National Alliance of Forest
Owners, National Environmental Development Association's Clean Air Project Utility Air Regulatory Group, Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission, Sierra Club, Clean Air Implementation Project, National Association of Manufacturers,
National Federation of Independent Business, Portland Cement Association, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and the States of Alabama and Texas.
CLIMATE CASE CHART, ARNOLD

&

PORTER, LLP 10, http://www.climatecasechart.

com (last updated June 21, 2011).
135. Richard E. Morton & Matthew E. Ross, Addressing the Major Climate Control
Issues, 2010 ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 21 (2010).

136. EPA Will Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for LightDuty Vehicles, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1 (May 2009), http://www.epa.gov/OMS/
climate/regulations/420f09028.pdf.
137. Richard A. Horsch & Neal McAliley, Alerts: EPA's Proposed GHG Tailoring
Rule - One Step Closer to Regulation of Large GHG Stationary Sources, WHITE &
CASE LLP 3 (Oct. 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/alert_10012009/ ("It may be that
the [Proposed Tailoring Rule], with its continued threat of the imposition of the Act's
command-and-control regime on a number of GHG sources nationwide, is yet an-
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cause the legislative branch failed to act, President Obama pushed the
EPA to take unilateral action.'3 However, the Clean Air Act does
not provide the EPA with the express authority to regulate carbon
dioxide or any other greenhouse gases on the basis of their climate
impact.'13 Whether the EPA may regulate greenhouse gases using its
implied authority under the Clean Air Act is the primary legal issue.14 0 Even if the EPA has implied authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act, its power to regulate is explicitly limited under the federal separation of powers.' 4 ' This Part will demonstrate that the tool the EPA implemented to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources, the Tailoring Rule, is an unreasonable extension of authority and is contrary to the Clean Air Act.
The EPA's Tailoring Rule should be found arbitrary and capricious
because it is: (1) in violation of the language of the Clean Air Act; (2)
contrary to congressional intent underlying the Clean Air Act; (3) an
infringement on the separation of legislative and executive powers;
and (4) an improper invocation of the disfavored Doctrines of "Absurd Results," "Administrative Necessity," and "One-Step-at-aTime." Just like the petitions challenging the Tailoring Rule assert,
the Rule represents an unauthorized power grab by the EPA because
the Agency's interpretations of the Clean Air Act would allow "regulation of virtually every activity in the United States, strictly, loosely,
or not at all," according to the EPA's choice of manner and

schedule.14 2
A.

The Tailoring Rule Conflicts with Prescriptive Language
in the Clean Air Act

The EPA's interpretation of the PSD triggering provisions violates
the unambiguous text of the Clean Air Act. Proper analysis begins
with section 108 of the Act, the PSD program's analogy of the Endangerment Finding. Under section 108(a)(1), for the purpose of establishing ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall publish,
and revise from time to time, a list that includes each air pollutant
"emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air polluother action intended, at least in part, to increase pressure on industry, states and
other stakeholders to support the passage of more carefully-tailored GHG national
legislation.").
138. Timothy Gardner & Thomas Ferraro, Senate Climate Bill in Perilas Democrats
Delay Action, REUTERS, July 23, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE66L4L520100723?pageNumber=2.
139. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & DAVID P. NOVELLO, THE CLEAN AIR AcT HANDBOOK 499 (American Bar Association, 2d ed. 2004).
140. Id.
141. The EPA, like all federal agencies, has no inherent powers. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress.").
142. Petitioners' Motion for Stay, supra note 69, at 9.
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tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare." 1 43 The text appears very similar to the text of section 202
upon which the EPA relied for making its Final Endangerment Finding. 144 In fact, the operative language is identical in both. 1 4 5
As previously discussed in Part II.B., the EPA's Endangerment
Finding under section 202 arguably triggers applicability of other
Clean Air Act provisions.146 The Final Endangerment Finding asserts
that elevated concentrations of six greenhouse gases endanger both
public health and welfare of current and future generations, and the
emissions of these greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and
their engines contribute to the endangerment.14 7 Under the PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act, section 108, if the EPA has determined
that emissions of an air pollutant "from numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources" endanger public health or welfare, it shall also
issue air quality criteria for those identified pollutants-known as
"criteria air pollutants."14 8 The mobile sources considered in the Final
Endangerment Finding under section 202(a) almost certainly qualify
as "numerous diverse mobile sources" for the purposes of an Endangerment Finding under section 108. Thus, under the unambiguous
text of the Clean Air Act, the EPA shall establish air quality criteria
for greenhouse gases.
The applicable air quality criteria are called National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS").14 9 The EPA establishes NAAQS to
represent maximum ambient air concentration levels such that the
general public and certain sensitive populations are not adversely impacted by air pollution.15 0 Although the EPA has argued that section
108 grants it discretion whether or not to establish NAAQS for criteria pollutants, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals previously opined
on the same issue: "While the literal language of [section]
108(a)(1)(C) is somewhat ambiguous, this ambiguity is resolved when
this section is placed in the context of the Act as a whole and in its
legislative history."' 5 1 When deciding whether EPA had such discre143. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006).
144. See supra Part III(B).
145. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006), with 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a)(1) (2006)
(both statutes use the language "reasonably ... anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare").
146. Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 295 ("the EPA very likely
will be forced by its Section 202 Endangerment Finding to issue a similar finding
under section 108, which will then trigger regulation of [greenhouse gases] under the
NAAQS framework detailed under sections 109 through 110.").
147. Final Endangerment Finding, supra note 47, at 66,496.
148. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2006); Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at
926.
149. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
150. See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2010).
151. Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1976).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

23

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 18 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 12

430

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

tion to issue air quality standards for lead in NaturalRes. Def Counsel
v. Train, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that it did not:
The structure of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, its legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act leave no
room for an interpretation which makes the issuance of air quality
standards for lead under section 108 discretionary. The Congress
sought to eliminate, not perpetuate, opportunity for administrative
foot-dragging. Once the conditions of sections 108(a)(1)(A) and
(B) have been met, the listing of lead and the issuance of air quality
standards for lead become mandatory.' 52
Similarly here, once the conditions of sections 108(a)(1)(A) and (B)
have been met, the issuance of air quality standards for greenhouse
gases become mandatory. As previously discussed in Part IV(A), the
Endangerment Finding under section 202 satisfies the conditions of
sections 108 (a)(1)(A) and (B). 5 3 Even though scientists and scholars
question whether NAAQS are well-suited to the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, 5 4 the text of the Clean Air Act does not provide
EPA the discretion whether or not it should establish air quality criteria once it makes an Endangerment Finding. 55
The PSD program is designed to prevent violations of the NAAQS
and compel the implementation of Best Available Control Technology
("BACT") to minimize air pollution from new or modified major
sources of emissions.156 Under the Tailoring Rule, however, neither
of these objectives will be achieved. The text of the Clean Air expressly limits PSD permitting to maintain NAAQS for the criteria air
152. Id. at 328.
153. Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 306.
154. See LARRY PARKER & JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40585, CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL REGULATION OF STATIONARY GREENHOUSE
GAS SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AcT 7-8 (2009) (identifying at least three
aspects of NAAQS that are ill-suited to the regulation of greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act); Brigham Daniels et al., Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean
Air Act?, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,837,10,838-39, (Mar. 30, 2009) (detailing objections to
using NAAOS to regulate GHGs); Louis Peck, A Veteran of the Climate Wars Reflects
on U.S. Failure to Act, YALE ENV'T 360 (Jan. 4, 2011) http://e360.yale.edu/mobile/
feature.msp?id=2356 (quoting former U.S. Rep. Rick Boucher: "What [EPA] can do
is really just regulate under the 1970 Clean Air Act, which essentially means point
source regulation. And that's the least efficient way to regulate greenhouse gases. So I
don't think EPA can do this work well, whatever its intentions, because it simply lacks
the legal mechanisms to do the job effectively."); Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?,
supra note 24, at 296 (citing ANPR, supra note 32, at 44,477-86) (discussing the difficulty of setting a NAAQS level and the conceptual incompatibilities between NAAQS
and greenhouse gases).
155. See Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24, at 284 (arguing that the
"EPA likely lacks much of the regulatory discretion it claims to have to regulate
[greenhouse gases] under the [Clean Air Act]," and "the EPA may be forced to set
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under sections 108 through 110 of
the [Act]."
156. Air Permits, Overview of the Prevention of Significant DeteriorationProgram,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.
html#purpose (last updated May 10, 2011).
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pollutants. In fact, the EPA indicates, "the basic purpose of the PSD
program .

.

. is to safeguard maintenance of the NAAQS."' 5 ' The

1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act primarily focus on attainment
of NAAQS through the codification of EPA's original PSD program,
which focused solely on pollutants for which NAAQS had been
established.' 5
The Tailoring Rule indicates, "[t]he PSD program applies in areas
that are designated 'attainment' or 'unclassifiable' for a [NAAQS]."'5 9
Because the EPA has not established NAAQS for greenhouse gases,
no region can be designated "attainment" or "unclassifiable"; therefore, no source should trigger PSD permitting under the text of the
Clean Air Act.'6 0 Further, the PSD program was created as a way to
compel BACT on major new sources and to review proposed prior
sources before construction to ensure that the major source's emissions would not interfere with NAAQS.16' As yet, there is no effective BACT for greenhouse gases. 62 In the absence of NAAQS and
BACT for greenhouse gases, PSD review would accomplish none of
its intended objectives.16 3
The Title V Program was enacted solely to codify all of the requirements established for a major source in other, independently applicable Clean Air Act provisions in one place.164 At the time the article
was written, there were no independent Clean Air Act provisions addressing greenhouse gases from stationary sources; thus, Title V permitting for greenhouse gases is meaningless paperwork.16 5 In effect,
157. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 34,549; see also Wis. Electric Power Co.
v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1990) (reporting that the PSD Program was added to the Clean Air Act in the 1977 Amendments to prevent "a decline of air quality
to the minimum levels permitted by NAAQS."); 42 U.S.C.A. § 4210(a)(2)(C) (West
2010) (describing PSD permits as "necessary to assure the [NAAQS] are achieved").
158. See S. REP. No. 95-127, at 11 (1977).
159. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,520.
160. Although the PSD requirements also apply to "unclassifiable" areas, experts
have argued that the "unclassifiable" designation was meant to address temporary
conditions based on the absence of monitoring data needed to establish NAAQS
rather than a permanent condition reflecting the inability to establish a NAAQS to
manage a widespread atmospheric condition. Thomas M. Donnelly et al., Climate
Change Regulation Via the Clean Air Act: EPA's New Greenhouse Gas Rule for Facilities, JONES DAY (June 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/climate-change-regulation.
161. Eric Groten, EPA's Proposed New "Tailoring Rule": Cleaning Up the "Glorious Mess" by Turning Off the Lights, VINsON & ELKINS, 8 (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.
velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/WPClimateChangeRegulation_2009_10
02.pdf#Pagel.
162. "[W]e expect the emissions differences due to BACT controls for such sources
to be relatively small due to the lack of available capture and control technologies for
GHG at such sources that are akin to those that exist for conventional pollutants and
sources, as well as the likelihood that even in the absence of BACT such sources
would already be installing relatively efficient GHG technologies to save on fuel
costs." Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,600.
163. Groten, supra note 161, at 8.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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EPA's Tailoring Rule, which triggers PSD and Title V permitting
when a source emits greenhouse gases above the statutory thresholds,
fails to execute the purposes stated in the unambiguous text of the
Clean Air Act.
B.

The Tailoring Rule Subverts CongressionalIntent

Critics of the EPA's greenhouse gas rulemaking argue that at the
time the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970 and amended in 1977 and
1990, Congress did not intend to authorize the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. The Supreme Court majority, however, found that the
statutory definition of "air pollutant" was broad enough to include
"all airborne compounds of whatever stripe."' 6 6 In fact, the Clean Air
Act was enacted "to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population."1 67 At the time the statute was
enacted, ambient levels of air pollution were much higher than they
are today.168 Therefore, scholars argue that the primary benefit Congress anticipated from the Clean Air Act was a reduction in the
probability and severity of more acute health effects suffered by the
presently living generation of Americans. 169 Today, health benefits
from further reductions in ambient air pollution are primarily reductions in the exposure to diseases with longer latency periods; therefore, the adverse impacts Congress intended to address under the
Clean Air Act are different from those adverse impacts resulting from
greenhouse gas emissions.170 Critics contend the fact that Congress
likely did not consider the present-day impacts of greenhouse gas
emissions in 1970 or 1977 implies that Congress did not intend for
these "pollutants" to be regulated under the Clean Air Act."7
One could argue, however, that recent congressional action-or inaction-is more relevant to the question of congressional intent. The
Clean Air Act did not even refer to carbon dioxide until the 1990
166. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007).
167. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
168. ELISSA Gurr, VICKIE PATTON& NANCY SPENCER, BUILDING ON 30

YEARS
OF CLEAN AIR Acr SUCCESS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING NOx AIR POLLUTION 9

(2000) (reporting that "[e]missions of carbon monoxide have been cut by 31 percent,
volatile organic compounds by 42 percent, [sulfur dioxide] by 37 percent, particulate
matter (PM-10) by 71 percent, and lead by 98 percent.").
169. Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The
Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 13 (2008).
170. Id. at 10-11.
171. Id. at 19; see also Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 933 ("The notion that Congress, in 1970 or 1977, implicitly authorized EPA to adopt economy-wide, or even
industry-specific, controls on CO 2 iS ludicrously unfounded."); Walsh et al., supra note
21, at 40 (". . . Congress simply did not have GHG emissions in mind when it originally drafted the CAA in 1970 or subsequently amended it in 1977 to include the PSD
program.").
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Amendments were passed.17 2 The legislative history of the 1990
Amendments indicates that Congress considered and explicitly rejected proposals to regulate greenhouse gases under the Act. 7 Although the Senate version of the bill to amend the Act, S. 1630,
emerged with findings and purposes specifically regarding global
warming and the need to regulate greenhouse gases, the House version of the bill, H.R. 3030, prevailed in completely eliminating the language in the Senate bill that would have authorized regulation of nonozone depleting greenhouse gases.'7 4 After the 1990 amendments, the
Act mentions greenhouse gases only by authorizing their monitoring
and evaluation on a non-regulatory basis.' 75 Specifically, carbon dioxide is listed as one of several compounds to be considered in EPA's
"basic engineering research and technology program to develop, eval6
uate, and demonstrate non-regulatory strategies and technologies."1
Further, the only instance where global warming is mentioned is in
Title VI, in which EPA is directed to evaluate the global warming potential of specific compounds that contribute to stratospheric ozone
depletion."7 This provision, however, also includes an express admonishment that it "shall not be construed to be the basis of any additional regulation under [the CAA]." 7 8 As the National Mining
Association's General Counsel nicely concludes, "[b]y specifically
considering this issue and resolving it against regulation, Congress
clearly withheld from EPA any powers to regulate [carbon
dioxide]." 7 9
Within the first decade of the twenty-first century, the science
presenting the causal connections between atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations, increasing global temperatures, and potential adverse effects of the global warming phenomenon has become more
172. Frederick D. Palmer et al., C02: A Pollutant?, The Legal Affairs Committee
Report to the National Mining Association Board of Directors on the Authority of
EPA to Regulate Carbon Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, NAT'L MINING ASS'N
(Oct. 12, 1998), http://www.nma.org/publications/coal/co2_pollutant.asp#anchor
introduction.
173. Veronique Bugnion & David M. Reiner, Note, A Game of Climate Chicken:
Can EPA Regulate Greenhouse Gases Before the U.S. Senate Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol?, 30 ENVTL. L. 491, 512 (2000).
174. Palmer et al., supra note 172 (citing S. 1630, 101st Cong., 135 CONG. REC.
20,521 (1989); H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 135 CONG. REC. 16,563 (1989)).
175. Id.
176. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g) (2006).
177. Palmer et al., supra note 172.
178. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671a(e) (2006).
179. Palmer et al., supra note 172 ("To accept the analysis proffered by EPA's general counsel is to presume a delegation of power merely by the absence of an express
withholding of such power-a view plainly out of step with the principles of administrative law. Congressional silence on carbon dioxide in this part of the CAA is audible. The intentions of Congress by such silence in the CAA's regulatory scheme
become unmistakable with its deliberate choice to address global warming and carbon
dioxide solely in the non-regulatory provisions of the statute.").
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compelling. International politics associated with global warming
thrust the issue into popular culture. Environmental litigation similar
to Massachusetts v. EPA is becoming more common in the federal
courts. 80 Logically, scholars argue that congressional support for climate policy regulation is stronger today than when the Clean Air Act
was passed and amended;"' yet, the legislature has failed to enact a
comprehensive greenhouse gas regulation statute or an amendment to
the Clean Air Act to address the issue. In 2007 and 2008, a number of
bills were introduced into both houses of Congress proposing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. 8 2 The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act earned the most attention and was
approved by the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, making it the first climate cap-and-trade bill to be reported to the
full Senate.18 1 Under the cap-and-trade measure proposed by the Climate Security Act, a shrinking cap on greenhouse gas emissions from
specified facilities was designed to achieve a 10% reduction from 2005
levels by 2020 and a 70% reduction from 2005 levels by 2050.184 The
Senate, however, tabled the bill after a few days of procedural debate
on the political difficulties of passing "groundbreaking" climate
legislation.'8 5
180. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (plaintiffs
brought climate-change nuisance claims based on alleged greenhouse gas emitters);
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010) (a group of Gulf Coast
landowners sued oil, coal, chemical, and insurance companies alleging that the defendants were responsible for greenhouse gas emissions that caused weather extremes
and the sea level to rise which increased the severity of Hurricane Katrina); Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska sued two dozen energy companies in an attempt to
recover damages for public nuisance related to emissions of greenhouse gases that the
Village alleged contributed to global warming and caused the sea level to rise, destroying parts of the Village).
181. Allen & Lewis, supra note 22, at 933 (citing Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up
to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 74 (2007) ("As this is being
written, the wheels of federal climate regulation are already in motion.")); Scott H.
Segal, Be Cool! Staying Open Minded About Climate Policy Development, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 307, 307 (2008).
182. John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction,
29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 29 n.192 (2008) (referring to seven comprehensive climate change
bills: Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007) and
companion bill Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007), Low
Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007), Global Warming Pollution
Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007), Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S.
485, 110th Cong. (2007), Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007), and
America's Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007)).
183. Lauren E. Schmidt & Geoffrey M. Williamson, Recent Developments in Climate Change Law, 37 COLO. LAw. 63, 65 (2008).
184. BRIAN C. MURRAY & MARTIN T. Ross, The Lieberman-Warner America's
Climate Security Act: A Preliminary Assessment of Potential Economic Impacts,
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIV., 2 (Oct. 2007), http://
www.usclimatepartnership.org/documents/LiebermanWarnerDukeEconomicSummaryOct2007.pdf.
185. Schmidt & Williamson, supra note 183, at 66.
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During the next congressional session in 2009, the House passed a
comprehensive climate change bill, the American Clean Energy and
Security Act ("ACES" or the "Waxman-Markey bill")."' The Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee also voted to bring a similar bill to the floor of the Senate-the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act ("the Kerry-Boxer Act").18 7 Both the House and
Senate bills addressed the same greenhouse gases and facilities, proposed a cap-and-trade scheme in which greenhouse gas emissions
could be traded among regulated facilities, and provided incentives
for carbon sequestration and the use of energy-efficient construcThe Senate bill, however, was more demanding and required
tion.'
major sources to reduce GHG emissions to levels 20% below 2005
levels by 2020, as opposed to the House bill's 17% reduction.' 8 9 More
critically, unlike the House bill, the Senate bill retained EPA authority
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.' 90 The
bill faced trouble from the beginning, however, because Republicans
objected to the way the bill passed out of committee and one of the
sponsors, Senator John Kerry, started working on an apparent replacement bill with Senators Lindsay Graham and Joe Lieberman.' 9 1
In May 2010, Senators Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman released a
draft discussion of their American Power Act which aimed to garner
more bipartisan support.192 None of these bills were passed into law.
Including the bills already mentioned, more than a dozen bills were
proposed or introduced into the 111th Congress that were intended to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions using market-based strategies.19 3
Citing a lack of bipartisan support overshadowed by the recent "climategate" scandal associated with the IPCC science, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid announced that upcoming energy legislation
would not include a cap on greenhouse gas emissions and effectively
186. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
187. S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
188. Walsh et al., supra note 21, at 39.
189. Id.
190. Gabrielle Siegel & Jennifer L. Cassel, 2009 Climate Change Year in Review:
Building Foundationsfor Change or Just Castles in the Sand?, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES
4838, 21 (Jan. 2010), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s20Publications/RelatedDocumentsPDFsl252/278O/SigelCassel_2009 ClimateChange-YearinReviewLexis
Nexis_.pdf.
191. Patrick Tutwiler, Climate Change Legislation: Where Does it Stand?, GovTRACK INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.govtrackinsider.comlarticles/2010-04-27/
climate-change.
192. 111th Congress Climate Change Legislation, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Aug. 16,
2011).
193. An Introduction to Climate Change Legislation, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE,
http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/climate-change-legislation-introduction.aspx
(last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (Other major proposals included H.R. 1337, S. 2877, and S.
2995, 111th Cong. (2009)).
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ended the action on climate legislation for the 111th Congress.' 9 4 As
the Supreme Court has said, congressional rejection of a statute
"strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result
that it expressly declined to enact."' 95 Starting with the Clean Air Act
Amendments in 1990 and continuing through two decades of debate
on the issue, Congress has repeatedly rejected efforts to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.' 9 6
In the absence of congressional action providing, or pre-empting,
express authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the EPA
pressed forward to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
sources under "implied authority" in the Clean Air Act. However,
the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions as pollutants does not fit
within the air pollution regulatory scheme created by Congress. The
air pollution concerns anticipated to be addressed by the Clean Air
Act, and particularly the PSD program, were primarily local in nature.' 97 Under the structure of the Clean Air Act, once the EPA establishes NAAQS for regulating criteria pollutants, states apply
NAAQS to individual stationary sources through state implementation plans, and the states ensure that each air quality control region
within the state meets the applicable NAAQS.' 98 In Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit held that the PSD permit requirement
of the Clean Air Act is based on location rather than impact on an
area.'9 Unlike traditional pollutants, however, greenhouse gases are
globally well-mixed and cause harm based on their total atmospheric
concentrations rather than localized concentrations. 200 As a result,
PSD provisions, which are local or regional in nature, are illogical solutions to regulate the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.20 '
Congress did not intend to apply PSD and Title V to small sources,
did not intend for those programs to crash under their own weight,
194. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 192.
195. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
196. Palmer et al., supra note 172.
197. Johnston, supra note 169, at 13-14.
198. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
199. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The plain meaning of the inclusion in section 165 of the words 'any area to which this part applies' is
that Congress intended location to be the key determinant of the applicability of the
PSD review requirements.").
200. Vera P. Pardee & Kassie R. Siegel, The Clean Air Act: An Indispensable Tool
to Combat Global Warming, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 38, 41 (2010).
201. Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 173, at 515 ("The local and regional focus of the
criteria air pollutant . . . provisions seems to create an almost insuperable obstacle to

the implementation of restrictions on the emissions of greenhouse gases through Titles I and II of the CAA."); Epstein, supra note 77, at 815 ("it doesn't make a difference whether you emit them in a heavy industrial zone like Los Angeles, or in the
Dakota Badlands or in Bangladesh. When it comes to the question of trying to trace
its consequences, all atoms are treated equally regardless of their source. Why then
use a local strategy for a newly-designated statutory pollutant that has no distinctive
local effects?").
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and did not intend for PSD to stifle economic growth.2 02 The purpose
statement of the Clean Air Act illustrates the delicate balance underlying most environmental legislation: the statute was enacted "to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of
its population." 20 3 Implicit in this statement is congressional intent to
protect both human health and the national economy. In fact, the related congressional reports emphasize the legislature's intent not only
to protect public health and welfare, but also to assure that future air
resources will be available for promoting industrial and energy development critical to the growth of the nation. 2 0 4 One stated purpose of
the PSD program is "to insure that economic growth will occur in a
manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources."2 0 5 The Title V program imposes no additional pollution
control requirements but is meant to streamline other Clean Air Act
provisions to encourage compliance with the Act.2 06 Increasing the
number of facilities requiring PSD permits, however, necessarily undermines the stated purpose of protecting economic growth.2 07 Further, compelling more facilities to apply for Title V operating permits
will not encourage compliance with the Clean Air Act.2 08
Most importantly, investors and energy developers are frustrated by
the Tailoring Rule's uncertain consequences: "Lenders and investors
are parting with their money grudgingly as it is nearly impossible to
price the risk."2 09 In fact, reports indicate the Tailoring Rule is discouraging renewable energy investments-the same type of projects
that could cooperatively work to reduce global warming.2 10 A study
202. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,308 (Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70 & 71) [hereinafter Proposed Tailoring Rule]); see also Ala.
Power Co., 636 F.2d at 353 ("Congress' intention [in passing the Clean Air Act] was
to identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear substantial
regulatory costs imposed by PSD provisions and which, as a group, are primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul our nation's air.");
H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 144-45 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-172, 96-97 (1977) ("Such a
[permitting] process is reasonable and necessary for very large sources, such as new
electrical generating plants or new steel mills. But the procedure would prove costly
and potentially unreasonable if imposed on construction of storage facilities for a
small gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a junior college,
each of which may have the potential to emit 100 tons of pollution annually.").
203. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
204. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 154.
205. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3).
206. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,521.
207. Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 202, at 55,308.
208. Id. at 55,311.
209. Morton & Ross, supra note 135.
210. See EPA TailoringRule JeopardizesRenewable Energy Investment, Jobs, Production Goals, NAT'L ALLIANCE OF FOREST OWNERS, (Dec. 15, 2010), http://nafoalliance.org/featured/epa-tailoring-rule-jeopardizes-renewable-energy-investment-jobsproduction-goals/.
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commissioned by the National Alliance of Forest Owners and conducted by Forisk Consulting found that the Tailoring Rule's treatment
of biomass emissions would put over 130 renewable energy projects at
risk for cancellation causing "$18.0 billion fewer dollars of capital investment in renewable electricity generation" in 2011.211 This study is
only one illustration of how using the overbroad provisions of the
Clean Air Act to combat global warming can lead to unintended and
antithetical consequences.
C.

The Tailoring Rule Relies Upon Disfavored Doctrines

Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the seminal case discussing the judiciary's deference to administrative statutory construction, courts must reject administrative constructions of a statute that frustrate the unambiguous policy Congress
sought to implement.2 12 As the previous discussion has demonstrated,
Congress did not intend the effects of the Tailoring Rule when it enacted the Clean Air Act or added the PSD and Title V programs. In
fact, the EPA expressly acknowledges its subversion of the congressional intent in the Tailoring Rule. The text of the Tailoring Rule's
preamble admits that Congress did not intend to overwhelm the PSD
or Title V permit programs "for relatively little gain, a result EPA
finds 'absurd' enough to conclude that Congress didn't intend to apply
the 250-ton threshold to GHGs." 213 The EPA, however, argues that
the Tailoring Rule mitigates the absurdities by "tailoring" the statutory thresholds. 2 14
The judicial doctrines the EPA relies upon for promulgating the Tailoring Rule are unpersuasive. To justify its actions, the EPA invokes
the rarely used doctrines of "absurd results," "administrative necessity," and "one-step-at-a-time." 2 1 5 In short, the absurd results doctrine provides that administrative agencies shall interpret statutes in a
way that implements the law without having an absurd result.21 6 The
administrative necessity doctrine suggests that, when interpreting statutes, an administrative necessity can sometimes justify the agency's
211. FORISK CONSULTING, ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE
TREATMENT OF BIOMASS ENERGY UNDER THE EPA GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING
RULE, at 9 (Dec. 2010), available at http://nafoalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/
NAFO-Study-Tailoring-Rule-Economic-Impact-20101214.pdf.
212. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). For a thorough discussion of the Chevron analysis as it applies to the Tailoring
Rule, see Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, supra note 24.
213. Groten, supra note 161, at 4.
214. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,516 ("EPA is relieving overwhelming permitting burdens that would, in the absence of this rule, fall on permitting authorities and sources. We accomplish this by tailoring the applicability criteria that
determine which GHG emission sources become subject to the PSD and Title V programs of the CAA.").
215. Id.
216. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
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plan of implementation. 21 7 The "one-step-at-a-time" doctrine is a new
judicial instrument created by the EPA that would allow it to revise
statutory language as long as it promises to comply with that language
sometime in the future.21
In the Agency's own words, "[a]pplying the threshold provisions literally [to PSD and Title V permits] would lead to results that contravene congressional intent and, in fact, undermine Congress's purposes
for both permitting programs." 2 19 Further, the EPA admits that "the
administrative strains would lead to multi-year backlogs in the issuance of PSD and Title V permits, which would undermine the purposes of those programs." 2 2 0 As previously discussed in Part III, the
EPA and its state counterparts would have to review approximately
82,000 PSD permits and 6.1 million Title V operating permits each
year. 2 2 ' The drain on governmental resources would result in significant delay, deter new construction, and expose millions of companies
to legal uncertainty-a cost not advocated by Congress. 2 2 These "absurd results" from regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the PSD
and Title V programs would force the EPA to violate other statutory
requirements. Under the "Preconstruction Requirements" in section
165 of the Clean Air Act, a permitting authority must grant or deny
any completed permit for a major emitting facility not later than one
year after the filing of the application.22 3 The Tailoring Rule conclusively states that such a timeline would be impossible to meet: "It
would be flatly impossible for permitting authorities to meet this statutory requirement if their workload increases from some 14,000 permits to 6.1 million. Instead, permit applications would face multi-year
delays in obtaining their permits." 224
In the face of these absurd results, the EPA's Tailoring Rule rewrites the statutory thresholds prescribed in the Clean Air Act. Marlo
217. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
218. Petitioners' Motion for Stay, supra note 69, at 31 (citing to 75 Fed. Reg. at
31,544 (2010)).
219. Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 202, at 55,303.
220. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,533.
221. Id. at 31,540, 31,536.
222. Mario Lewis, EPA Endangerment Showdown: Should Congress Heed Russell
Train's Advice?, MASTERRESOURCE, (June 1, 2010), http://www.masterresource.org/
2010/06/epa-endangerment-showdown-rt-advice/. Russell Train served as EPA Administrator under the Nixon and Ford Administrations (1973-1977); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7470 (1990) (The PSD program was intended "to insure that economic
growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clear air
resources."); H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 144 (1977) (legislation "not only protect[s]
public health and welfare but also assur[es] future air resources will be available for
continuing the industrial and energy development so necessary for the growth of the
Nation"); Walsh et al., supra note 21, at 40 (citing S. REP. No. 94-717, at 23 (1976))
(noting that Congress did not intend to simply create delays or impair economic
growth).
223. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c) (2006).
224. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,564.
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Lewis, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, comments that the EPA appears to have us believe that Congress wrote
such self-destruction provisions into the statute from the start. "Then
all of a sudden, the dormant bug became active, and now the [Clean
Air Act] is going haywire, working at cross purposes with itself, subverting congressional intent, and imperiling the nation's economic future. Therefore, EPA must step in, play lawmaker, and amend the
Act."22 5 The problem with using the doctrines of absurd results and
administrative necessity to regulate greenhouse gases from stationary
sources, however, is analogous to police officers creating exigent circumstances to avoid the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.22 6 As previously discussed, none of the EPA's actions were
statutorily compelled; therefore, the Agency erred in calling upon
these doctrines to solve its self-imposed emergency.
Although administrative necessity has been used to expand the
scope of federal authority, the EPA's use of the doctrine in the Tailoring Rule stretches its implied authority too far. Even though the Supreme Court has recognized that "administrative necessity may be a
basis for finding implied authority for an administrative approach not
explicitly provided in the [Clean Air Act]," the Court also warned that
"its role was not 'to overturn congressional assumptions embedded
into the framework of regulations established by the Act.'" 2 27 The
EPA argues that the circumstances underlying the Tailoring Rule support invocation of the administrative necessity doctrine; however, the
Agency could not cite a single case in which a court approved a prospective use of the doctrine.22 8 While administrative agencies may
have discretion to create modifications at the margins of a regulatory
field, the EPA should not be permitted to substitute its judgment for
the unambiguous intent of Congress.22 9
Finally, in case its use of "absurd results" and "administrative necessity" were not convincing, the EPA created its own judicial doctrine, taking its regulatory mandate "one step at a time." 230 The
Agency explains that Congress is presumed to allow it to administer
the statutory requirements "on a step-by-step basis, as appropriate,
when the agency remains on track to implement the requirements as a
whole." 23 1 Under the Tailoring Rule, however, the EPA has no inten225. Mario Lewis, EPA's Tailoring Rule: Temporary, Dubious, Incomplete Antidote
To Massachusetts v. EPA's Legacy of Absurd Results (Part 1), MASTERRESOURCE
(Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.masterresource.org/201 0/01/epas-tailoring-rule-temporarydubious-incomplete-antidote-to-massachusetts-v-epas-legacy-of-absurd-results/.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Exigent
circumstances, however, do not meet Fourth Amendment standards if the government deliberately creates them.").
227. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
228. See Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 202, at 55,316.
229. Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 869 F.2d 1541, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
230. Final Tailoring Rule, supra note 103, at 31,544.
231. Id. at 31,517.
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tions of eventually complying with the statutory thresholds prescribed
by the PSD and Title V provisions. Rather, the Tailoring Rule rewrites the Clean Air Act's regulatory thresholds and only hints at future rulemaking that may approach the statutory requirements.2 3 2
The revision of statutory thresholds in the Tailoring Rule is substantively different from gradually implementing compliance with statutory requirements; therefore, the "one-step-at-a-time" doctrine is
equally unpersuasive.
D.

The EPA's Rulemaking Violates the Federal Separation of
Powers

In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that administrative agencies
have considerable discretion to interpret statutes where the text is "silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue" ;233 however, there
is nothing ambiguous about the statutory thresholds written in the
Clean Air Act. Although the Tailoring Rule doesn't say it in so many
words, the EPA is unilaterally amending the Clean Air Act. To avoid
absurd results, the Rule purports to change numerical, statutorily
codified, thresholds for applying the PSD and Title V programs to stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions.2 34 Nothing in the Clean
Air Act permits the EPA to dilute or suspend the statutory requirements, and the Agency should not be allowed to amend legislation to
cure an unreasonable interpretation of that legislation.2 35 As Marlo
Lewis persuasively argues, "[t]he Tailoring Rule is actually an Amending Rule. As such, it is prima facie illegal-an unconstitutional breach
of the separation of powers. "236
The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources,
a matter with such significant impact and far spread reach, and with
such an elaborate history of congressional attention, is most likely not
appropriate for an administrative agency to implement. Political, economic, and environmental issues of nationwide impact should be decided by Congress in a comprehensive bill. The delegation doctrine
ensures that "important choices of social policy are made by Congress,
the branch of our Government most responsible to the popular
will." 237 Given the decades of congressional debate concerning greenhouse gas emission regulation and the absence of persuasive mandate,
232. Id. at 31,518; Petitioners' Motion for Stay, supra note 69, at 31.
233. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
234. Motion for Coordination of Related Cases at 13, Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 10-1131 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/1 3/documentgw_06.pdf.
235. See Proposed Tailoring Rule, supra note 202, at 55,295.
236. Lewis, supra note 225.
237. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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the EPA has very little support for its implied authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.2 3 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The import and widespread impact of climate change will challenge
all three branches of the government to change. As presented in this
Comment, the judiciary appears to recognize the scientific nexus between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming as well as the
projected harms anticipated to result from climate change. Further,
the plurality opinion from Massachusetts v. EPA appears to embrace
the need to adjust traditional judicial constructs, such as standing, causation, and aggregate harm, to provide a remedy for climate change
controversies.
Under the direction of the Obama Administration, the EPA has
forged ahead with regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the
Clean Air Act in the absence of another piece of comprehensive legislation. Yet attempting to fit the climate change problem into the complexity of the Clean Air Act has presented numerous problems. The
EPA attempted to remedy the problems with the Tailoring Rule; however, the Rule is an unreasonable expansion of the EPA power because it acts outside of congressional intent and direction
unambiguously expressed in the Clean Air Act. Notably missing from
the EPA's justification for imposing the Tailoring Rule is any analysis
of the environmental benefits associated with the significant regulatory burden.2 3 9 Perhaps the Agency's silence speaks volumes about
the true effectiveness of its command-and-control regimen on a global
issue.
W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE & EN427 (Environmental Law Institute 2001).
239. Reed Rubenstein, More on the GHG Rule, E2 LAW BLOG, GREENBERG
TRAURIG (May 13, 2010), http://www.environmentalandenergylawblog.com/tags/tailoring-rule/.
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